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ABSTRACT: The modern edition of Parmenides’ 
poem (from Fülleborn’s 1795 work onwards) 
consolidated the well-known dichotomical scheme 
according to which its fragments are established and 
understood, i. e., attributing them to either one of two 
main “parts”, following the Proem, that is, to Truth 
(Alêtheia) or Opinion (Doxa). A careful review of the 
doxographical testimonies, however, reveals sufficient 
indications to cast doubt over this well-accepted 
representation. In this paper, I analyze some of these 
testimonials – particularly those found in Simplicius – 
aiming to show the evidence for an important 
distinction between what the Ancients called a section 
“On Opinion” (ta pros doxan) and the Parmenidean 
Cosmogony properly. We shall see that this hypothesis 
implies a “deflationary” view of the Doxa, limited to 
verses 53-61 of fragment 8, in addition to the four 
verses of fragment 9. The cosmogonical account, 
moreover, as we would like to show, should not be 
simply understood as any collection of “mortal 
opinions” – in the sense of their devaluation in the 
first part of the poem (cf. B1,30; B6,4-9; B7,3-5) – but 
instead as importing epistemological features into the 
description of the origins of the present state of the 
universe. Finally, we extract from this picture some 
consequences for the understanding of the role of the 
argument on Being and the limits of Parmenidean 
“ontology”. 
KEYWORDS: Parmenides, Doxa, Cosmology, 
Doxography, Simplicius. 
RESUMO: A edição moderna do poema de 
Parmênides (a partir do trabalho de Fülleborn de 
1795) consolidou o esquema dicotômico bem 
conhecido de acordo com o qual os fragmentos são 
estabelecidos e compreendidos, isto é, se os atribuindo 
a uma ou outra de duas “partes” seguintes ao Proêmio, 
a Verdade (Alêtheia) ou a Opinião (Doxa). Um exame 
cuidadoso dos testemunhos doxográficos, no entanto, 
revela indicações suficientes para lançar dúvidas sobre 
essa representação geralmente aceita. Neste artigo, 
analiso alguns dos testemunhos – particularmente 
aqueles encontrados em Simplício – com o objetivo de 
apontar a evidência em favor de uma importante 
distinção entre o que os antigos chamaram uma seção 
“Sobre a opinião” (ta pros doxan) e a Cosmogonia 
parmenídea propriamente. Veremos que essa hipótese 
implica uma perspectiva “deflacionária” da Doxa, que 
fica limitada aos versos 53–61 do fragmento 8, 
juntamente aos quatro versos do fragmento 9. O relato 
cosmogônico, ademais, não deve ser simplesmente 
entendido como uma coleção de “opiniões de mortais” 
– no sentido de sua desvalorização na primeira parte 
do poema (cf. B1,30; B6,4–9; B7,3–5) – mas mais 
bem como um discurso que importa características 
epistemológicas para a descrição das origens do 
estado presente do universo. Por fim, extraímos desse 
quadro algumas consequências para o entendimento 
do papel do argumento sobre o ser e os limites de 
“ontologia” parmenídea. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE : P a r m ê n i d e s . D o x a . 
Cosmologia. Doxografia. Simplício. 
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The Poem in its modern text establishment 
The debate on Parmenidean cosmology has become a prominent 
subject of investigation in recent years. The clarification of its status is 
critical for the understanding of the Poem and its philosophical and 
scientific horizons. Despite the growing interest in discussing the few 
textual citations and the many available indirect testimonies about 
Parmenides’ cosmology, an important presupposition has not yet been 
called into question. And it is precisely this presupposition that I would 
like to challenge here, namely that deciding on Parmenides commitment 
on cosmological propositions present in the Poem would amount to 
solving the problem of their ascription (or not) to a section of the poem 
called the “Doxa.”   1
The hermeneutical problem faced by modern scholars is the 
following: it is clear that the Goddess directs a strong criticism against 
what, in a first development of the Poem, is named the “opinions of 
mortals” (doxai brotôn). Nevertheless, already at the beginning of her 
speech, she conveys an injunction to learn not only about the “all-
rounded heart of truth,” but also something – but we do not know what 
exactly – concerning the perspective of mortals. A robust, systematical 
distinction is put forward between truth and opinions. Moreover, the 
doctrine of Being is, beyond a shadow of a doubt, identified with 
Truth.   The difficulty is, first, to explain the appeal of “learning about 2
the doxai,” considering their being outright dismissed in the 
development of the goddesses’ argument about Being. Second, the 
epistemological status of the poem’s cosmology remains problematic, 
insofar as it is somehow identified with the “Doxa,” usually understood 
as a “Second Part” of the Poem, starting at B8,51. 
 See for example the approach proposed by Cordero (“The ‘Doxa of Parmenides’ Dismantled”), with the suggestion 1
of separating true cosmological propositions from the Doxa, and attributing them to Alêtheia.
 Cf. B8,50-51: ἐν τῷ σοι παύω πιστὸν λόγον ἠδὲ νόηµα, ἀµφὶς ἀληθείης.2
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Even though recent scholarship has been increasingly recognizant 
of the importance of Parmenides’ cosmogony, astronomy, embryology, 
and physiology, the question of the recovery of these subjects is 
frequently framed in terms of the possibility of accepting or not 
“opinions” (doxai) about the universe. However, are the cosmological 
propositions present in the Poem (or some of them) to be assumed as 
opinions of any kind or provenience, mortal or otherwise? The problem, 
as we would like to show in what follows, is perhaps badly stated, and 
stems from a modern representation of Parmenides’ work. It is only in 
1795, with Fülleborn’s attempt at a reconstruction of the Poem from the 
known citations at his disposal, that a division in two main parts is 
proposed, following the prologue preserved by Sextus Empiricus. 
Remarkably enough, when arguing for the labelling of these two parts 
in an attempt to make use of expressions found in Simplicius and others, 
Fülleborn quotes Diogenes Laertius, who tells us that according to 
Parmenides “philosophy is double, according to the truth, and according 
to the opinion” (IX, 3,2).  A systematic distinction between truth and 3
opinion is taken by Fülleborn to represent the fundamental organization 
of the work itself. The dichotomical editorial scheme is then accepted 
without being questioned by the successive editors: Brandis soon 
adopted it in 1813. Karsten, to whom we are indebted for the complete 
gathering of the verses as we now have them, relies mostly on 
Fülleborn’s work for his 1835 edition.   He effectively consolidates the 4
procedure of assigning all the fragments, except for the prologue, to 
either the Alêtheia or the Doxa part of the poem. The approach is 
reproduced in Mullach’s editions (1845, 1860), which form the basis for 
Diels’ Parmenides Lehrgedicht (1897), and becomes standard with the 
publications of the Fragmente der Vorsokratier. Following the proem, 
except for fragment B4 – about whose placement editors often hesitate – 
 Fülleborn, 22.3
 For the history of the establishment of the poem’s text, see Cordero (“L’histoire du text de Parménide”), 8-15.4
Doxa, Diakosmêsis and Being in Parmenides’ Poem CONTE, Bruno
ANAIS DE FILOSOFIA CLÁSSICA, vol. 14 n. 27, 2020 ISSN 1982-5323 179
the verses to be considered are assigned to either one of those parts: On 
the one hand, we have the components of the section On Truth (from 
B2,1 to B8,52); on the other hand, we have the “remaining” fragments, 
collated between B8,61 and B19, and grouped under the name of Doxa, 
taken to form a “second part” of the poem. 
This state of affairs concerning the representation of the structure 
of the poem would have significant consequences for its interpretation. 
Zeller first develops a reading, later radicalized by Diels,  according to 5
which Parmenides, in the cosmological verses, does not intend to 
communicate propositions to which he – by means of the Goddess’ 
voice – would have been committed. Instead, according to this view, 
through those propositions Parmenides actually conveys a reconstruction 
of opinions elaborated by third-parties, presenting a false doctrine on 
purpose. Its pedagogical intention would be to instruct the audience on 
how to criticize cosmological self-contradictory beliefs, developing a 
model to serve as an object of criticism once the argument on being and 
not-being has been established as a fundamental truth. The “eristic” or 
“hypothetical” view of the Doxa established by the end of the nineteenth 
century would become a significant trend in Parmenides scholarship. Its 
traces, albeit significantly modified, are still recognizable in 
interpretations of contemporary authors.  6
The doxographical tradition about the Doxa section                                                       
This hermeneutical paradigm, however, poses an issue if we take 
into account the doxographical tradition. From a very early date, a 
number of testimonies provide us with clear indications of cosmological 
 Zeller, 491; Diels (“Über die ältesten Philosophieschulen der Griechen”), 250.5
 For Cordero (“The ‘Doxa of Parmenides’ Dismantled”), 240, the Doxa section conveys a false theory that explains 6
reality by two principles, day and night. For Curd, the Goddess tells a deceptive story, to teach how to identify 
illegitimate cosmological principles.
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doctrines attributed to Parmenides himself. These are found in 
Aristotle’s available texts, in the indirect quotes by Theophrastus found 
in Simplicius, and in Simplicius’ own words (and in agreement with the 
parallel testimonies of Plutarch and Asclepius), not to mention sources 
derived from Aëtius. But this is a point to which I shall come back later. 
For now, allow me to bracket the examination of the cosmological 
content found in the doxography in order to make a point about the 
information we can draw from our sources when they provide their 
testimony on the Doxa section. As mentioned before, the titles assigned 
by modern editors, with their representation of a poem divided into two 
main parts, are based on certain formulae effectively found in the 
doxography. Expressions like en tois pros doxan and en tois pros alêtheian, 
with dative neutral plurals, are the less ambiguous ones for the 
designation of passages where Parmenides would have dealt with Doxa 
and Alêtheia respectively. They might be translated as “in the verses 
concerning opinion” and “in the verses concerning truth.” These two 
examples are quite remarkable, as they attest to a tradition of restricting 
a set of verses in the poem to which the Ancients made reference by the 
name of “Doxa” (and this is otherwise an indication of some degree of 
importance attributed to this “section” of the poem). On the other hand, 
some of the doxographical material and, in particular, some important 
passages found in Simplicius, are not clear cases of references to a 
specific, identifiable piece of the original Parmenidean work: in fact, 
Simplicius, in addition to the Greek expressions we have just mentioned, 
also employs pros doxan   and epi doxan   in contexts where he is not 7 8
directly referring to the text of the poem, but rather explaining that – or 
instead giving an interpretation according to which – generation exists 
“relative to opinion” but not to truth, or that Parmenides at some point 
changes his level of analysis, “descending” (metelthôn) from truth “to 
 SIMPL. In de caelo, 556,12-14.7
 SIMPL. In Phys., 30,16.8
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opinion.” In addition, following Platonic ontological criteria, Simplicius 
names the objects of sensation and opinion in the plural, opposing them 
to the objects of the intelligible realm, fleshing out his interpretation 
with occasional references to the poem. So, we find expressions like en 
tois doxastois,  “in the section about the objects of opinion” and also peri 9
tôn doxastôn,   “about the objects of opinion.” 10
We should methodologically distinguish between those passages 
and expressions where ontological concepts are employed, an exegetical 
procedure, on the one hand, that betrays Simplicius’ undeniable (and 
undenied) intention to provide for a Platonic interpretation of 
Parmenides, and those contexts and pieces of information, on the other 
hand, that merely indicate the placement of some sets of verses in the 
poem, barely relying on Simplicius’ philosophical project.   As we shall 11
see, according to the indications provided by the Neoplatonic 
commentator, we can reasonably determine what was, in the ancient 
tradition and unlike our modern representation, identified as a Doxa 
“section” in the poem. Simplicius is, for this purpose, a unique source, as 
he gives us a good deal of information on verses which he explicitly says 
come “before” or “later,” “immediately” or “somewhere after” some other 
verses. He effectively gives us many indications, if not on how to 
assemble all the pieces of the puzzle, at least of its general framework, as 
shown by the table below:   12
 SIMPL. In Phys., 147, 28.9
 SIMPL. In Phys., 146, 29.10
 Pace Kurfess, 139 and n. 13, who takes all expressions as equivalent.11
  The picture we can draw from Simplicius’ indications puts some limits on the liberties taken by interpreters on the 12
possibilities of reconstruction of the poem. In particular, it seems to resist Cordero’s suggestion of assigning the 
cosmological announcement in B11 to the Alêtheia section (see Cordero, “The ‘Doxa of Parmenides’ Dismantled” 
242–243 and 245).
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Moreover, a second question about those testimonies was missed 
because of the modern representation of the poem: what is the thematic 
content referred to by our sources when they talk about verses 
“concerning Opinion” (peri doxan) – and not “according to 
opinion” (kata doxan)? Despite the anachronistic vocabulary, our sources 
are consistent in associating what they call a Doxa section with the 
postulation of an opposition of cosmological principles (arkhai), causes 
Ἡ διακόσµησις
τὰ πρός δόξαν (In phys. 25,14)
B8, 53-59 (In de caelo, 557,19-558,11: µέλλων 
περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν)
(In phys., 179,27-180,2: µετὰ τὰ περὶ 
ἀληθείας)
περὶ τῶν δυεῖν στοιχείων B9 (Ibid.: µετ᾽ὀλίγα πάλιν)
περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν
B11 (In phys., 559,20-560,1: περὶ τῶν 
αἰσθητῶν ἀρξασθαί)
τὸ ποιητικόν B12 (In phys., 39,12: µετ᾽ὀλίγα δὲ πάλιν 
περὶ τῶν δυεῖν στροιχείων εἰπῶν 
ἐπάγειν καὶ τὸ ποιητικόν)
ἡ γένεσις τῶν γινοµένων 
καὶ φθειροµένων µέχρι 
τῶν µορίων τῶν ζῴων
(In de caelo, 559,20-560,1: τὴν γένεσιν 
τῶν γινοµένων κτλ. παραδίδωσι)
B19 (In de caelo, 557,19-558,11: παραδοὺς 
δὲ τὴν τῶν αἰσθητῶν διακόσµησιν)
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(aitia) or elements (stoikheia) variously rendered as Fire and Earth, Hot 
and Cold, or Bright and Dark.   The accounts are also unanimous in 13
attributing this doctrine of opposite principles to Parmenides himself, 
nowhere indicating that the ancient doxographers saw in it any 
systematical reconstruction with polemical intentions, as believed Zeller 
and his followers. 
The distinction between Doxa  
and Diakosmêsis in the Ancient tradition 
Simplicius comments on Aristotle’s claim that Parmenides 
postulated the principles as opposites,  and on this occasion he actually 14
indicates the relevant portion of the poem where such a philosophical 
assumption was to be found: in lines 53 to 59 of B8, in addition to the 
four verses of B9.   That is: the relevant philosophical content of those 15
verses was rendered, according to a tradition to which Simplicius 
testifies, in the conceptual framework of opposing arkhai, the 
postulation of which this tradition recognizes as an important feature of 
Parmenidean thinking. 
There is, nevertheless, a remarkable contrast in Simplicius’ 
accounts which is not usually considered by modern students of 
 THEOPHRASTUS. Physic. op., 3,2 (= SIMPL. In Phys., 25,14): καὶ τῶν πεπερασµένας [τῶν δὲ πλείους 13
λεγόντων… ἔθεντο τῷ πλήθει τὰς ἀρχὰς] οἱ µὲν δύο ὡς Παρµενίδης ἐν τοῖς πρός δόξαν πῦρ καὶ γῆν (ἢ µᾶλλον 
φῶς καὶ σκοτὸς)… ALEXANDRE. In Met., 670,21: Π. δὲ ἐν τοῖς πρὸς δόξαν πῦρ καὶ γῆν [οὐσίαν καὶ ἀρχὴν 
ἐτίθετο]. THEMISTIUS. In Phys., V, 2, 17,29: καὶ γὰρ ὁ Π. ἐν τοῖς πρὸς δόξαν τὸ θερµὸν ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν 
ἀρχάς. PHILOPON. In Phys. 22,2: ὅτι ὁ Π. ἐν τοῖς πρὸς δόξαν πῦρ καὶ γῆν ἔλεγεν εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων. 
Ibid., 126,1: ἐν τοῖς πρὸς δόξαν δύο λέγειν τὰς ἀρχὰς, ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ἓν εἶναι λέγοντα.
 Phys. I 5, 188a19-22.14
 SIMPL. In Phys., 179,27-180,12. See also the table above.15
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Parmenides: when quoting those verses, Simplicius employs the 
traditional formula en tois pros doxan; however, in at least one important 
occasion, when talking about Parmenidean Cosmogony, beginning, 
according to him, with B11 and B12, and ending with B19, Simplicius 
does not call it Doxa, but instead names it a Diakosmêsis.  16
The presence of the term diakosmêsis does not appear to be 
gratuitous. It echoes diakosmos, a word whose first attestation is in verse 
60 of B8 in our Poem.   Yet, there is a difference in meaning between 17
these terms: the deverbal noun with suffix -sis is appropriate to 
designate the cosmogonical processes and the “ordering” of the 
universe.   What, then, should we understand by diakosmos? Most of 18
the interpreters take the word in B8,60 to refer either to the actual 
universe   or to the cosmogonical discourse itself.   If we took this to 19 20
be the correct referent for the term, there would be no grounds in the 
text for postulating a difference between Doxa and Diakosmêsis. 
However, τόν διάκοσµον in this verse can be assumed to be anaphoric,  21
referring precisely to the verses 55-59 coming immediately before it, 
and to should then be read with demonstrative value. In the broader 
context where the aforementioned verses are located (B8,51 ff.), the 
Goddess presents the pair of forms “fire” and “night,” insisting that the 
Kouros pay attention to her “deceiving order of words” (kosmos epeôn 
 SIMPL. In de caelo, 557,19-558,11.16
 Finkelberg (“On the History of the Greek Κόσµος”), 130 n. 98.17
 We can see that stabilization of the term kosmos to designate the universe with Plato. According to Kahn, this sense 18
is already found in Gorgias 508a. For Finkelberg (“On the History of the Greek Κόσµος”), 127-8, we should only 
consider passages in dialogues from the late period: the Timaeus (28b3), the Statesman (269d8) and the Philebus (29e1; 
59a3), where there is exact synonymy with ouranos.
 To cite some of the most recent works: Marcinkowska-Rosól, 140-3; Bredlow, 276; Pulpito, 204-5.19
 Verdenius, 50; Guthrie, 51; Finkelberg (“Being, Truth and Opinion in Parmenides”), 236-237, among others.20
 A possibility already noticed by Cornford, 108 and Long (“The Principles of Parmenides’ Cosmogony”), 104.21
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apatelôn, B8,52).   She then highlights the contrast, and suggests an 22
alternating dynamics (and perhaps a sequence in time) of, on the one 
hand, the predicates bright, soft and on the other, of dark, dense and 
heavy. What the tradition interpreted as a “postulation of principles,” in 
the language of the poem actually corresponds a “cosmic 
arrangement” (diakosmos) of contrary predicates, according to which “all 
things” (panta = morphai) are presented, i. e. from a scientific perspective. 
The doxographic tradition identified a two-step argumentative scheme: 
first, the positing of opposing elements, followed by the unfolding of a 
cosmogonical discourse, built on the grounds of those principles. Both 
Plutarch and Asclepius also bear witness to this scheme, even if they do 
not quote the exact verses.   23
According to this evidence, the Doxa section may be 
distinguished from the larger body of the Diakosmêsis: from the former, 
we only have the 15 verses quoted by Simplicius (B8,51-61; B9,1-4), a 
figure that obviously disallows its simple identification as a “Second Part” 
of the poem. Such a deflationary view of the Doxa, based on the 
tradition of testimonies employing the formula en tois pros doxan, allows 
us to dissociate Parmenidean cosmology from any “doxastic” value. 
Thus, it attempts to dismiss this identification of Doxa and Diakosmêsis 
as a false problem created by the modern representation of the poem’s 
structure in its arbitrary two-part division. 
 For the sense of epea as “sequence of words,” see Diller, 47.22
 PLUTARCH. Adv. Colotem, 1114b7-9; ASCLEPIUS, In Met., 42,26. Most interestingly, Plutarch may be saying 23
that Parmenides “poetically composes a cosmic arrangement” (διάκοσµον πεποιήται), referring to the highly stylized 
presentation of the pairs of opposites. He also says that those elements are combined, and that “from them and 
through them, (P.) accomplishes the totality of appearances” (ἐκ τούτων τὰ φαινόµενα πάντα καὶ διὰ τούτων 
ἀποτελεῖ). Because the elements have a cognitive import, as we shall see next, it is also possible that Plutarch’s latter 
formulation is a rendering of B1, 32: διὰ παντὸς πάντα (τὰ δοκοῦντα εἶναι). The employment of two verbs (poieô 
and apoteleô) indicates a two-step scheme (the postulation of principles and the development of the cosmogony), and 
the same applies for the passage in Asclepius, with the repetition of hypothithêmi.
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The role of a Diakosmêsis in the global  
argument of the Poem                                                      
As has been suggested by Rossetti, who is also opposed to the 
modern dichotomic view, we can find in the poem not only the division 
between Truth and Opinion at B8,50-51 but many “meta-discursive 
declarations” that allow Parmenides to distinguish and make transitions 
between arguments of different natures.   However, this 24
acknowledgement should not prevent us from investigating the 
possibility of an organic relation entertained by each of those distinct 
“sections” to the global discursive strategy of the Poem. In particular, we 
do not need to resort to the kind of interpretation that was once 
assumed by Nietzsche, seeing Parmenidean cosmology as some “pre-
critical” doctrine severed from the strong argument on Being and Not-
Being. 
Moreover, the feature of a unified endeavour is suggested by the 
Goddess herself, when she says it is incumbent upon the Kouros to be 
informed about “everything.” The word panta (B1,28) could prima facie 
simply express, to Parmenides’ original audience, an affinity with the 
scientific speculations typical from Ionian and Milesian traditions.  25
However, she soon specifies the meaning of “everything” in an 
unexpected and original sense:  the distinction between the “unshaken 26
heart of well-rounded truth” and the “opinions of mortals” deprived of 
true pistis (B1,29-30). This movement introduces a second-order 
consideration of knowledge that substantially defines the novelty of 
 Rossetti, 213, identifies these transitions in B1.29-32, B8,3-4, B8,50-52, B8,53-54, B10-11 and B19.24
 See Long (“The Scope of Greek Philosophy”) for the typical characterization of the early thinkers’ pursuit as 25
knowledge about “everything.”
 We should otherwise notice that the procedure of creating certain expectations on the audience and subsequently 26
frustrating them to introduce the novelty of his message is a rhetorical device extensively employed by Parmenides in 
the Proem, with the background of Homeric, Hesiodic and Orphic traditions. See Conte.
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Parmenides’ thinking. 
The complementarity of the two themes is expressed by the 
êmen… êde… construction, which denotes a strong “and” in a double 
affirmation:  the Kouros should not simply learn “A followed by B”, but 27
“A in conjunction with B” (Mullach appropriately translates autem… 
et… et…). The teaching about both objects thus appears to amount to a 
unified task and not to different steps in the Goddess’ curriculum.  28
However, what would the interest be in learning about opinions whose 
trustworthiness is denied from the start? The Goddess cannot be 
referring, in a very trivial manner, directly to their contents. It seems that 
the subject proposed at vv. 29-30 must be apprehended in a formal 
rather than in a material perspective: inasmuch as the Kouros is to follow 
the Goddess’ pistos logos (B8,50), he should discover, by the same token, 
the reasons to understand that the opinions of mortals are devoid of pistis 
alethês. The discrimination (krinein) of Being and Non-Being, alongside 
the exclusion of Non-Being,  allows for a critical perspective about the 29
judgments of mortals, who erroneously assign “being” (and “non-
being”) to each and every one of the things they are used to naming. 
The delimitation of the strict conditions of naming to eon in Truth is at 
the same time a rejection of the overpredication of “being” in ordinary 
human experience and language. 
 Denniston, 280, 287.27
 Pace Schwabl, 399-402, who sees three different stages announced by B1.29/B1.30/B1.31-32. After Truth, he draws 28
a distinction between a “negative” and a “positive” Doxa section, corresponding respectively to B8,55-59 and the 
cosmological discourse, which he considers as a traditional cosmogony. We have seen, though, that the doxographers 
recognize in the Doxa a positive theory of principles, which implies considering the passage not merely as negative 
but, as we shall see, as conveying a positive and also “critical” intention. Nevertheless, neither is this merely a 
traditional cosmogony, as we would like to show soon, nor are we forced to consider it a collection of special doxai. 
“Opinions” names in the poem, through and through, the kind of knowledge to be criticized. There are no “true 
opinions,” and that expression would be an oxymoron in the language of the poem.
 Both Plato and Simplicius understood Parmenides’ argument as a confutation of Not-Being (Plato. Sophist, 239b2; 29
SIMPL. In Phys., 144.29).
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The Doxa section, then, presents the real grounds for the naming 
of things: everything has been named according to the dynameis of 
Light and Night (B9). Those principles or forces can only be revealed 
after the ontological distinction of Being and Not-Being, because only 
then will the theoretical means have been provided to dismantle the 
pseudo-identity of the morphai (which are the objects of mortal 
judgments and should not be confused with the arkhai).   Mortals name 30
things and err, for indeed in naming them they are trapped in the 
illusion (apatê), produced by language, that things could have the 
stability, homogeneity, and integrity that only belongs to “what is” (to 
eon). In so doing, mortals are led to proclaim contradictorily that things 
“are and also are not” (cf. einai te kai oukhi, B8,40). Everything known 
in the universe (panta) remains the effect of misleading judgments 
(dokounta) because mortals lack the epistemological criticism that would 
first prompt them to investigate, for each of those things known in the 
universe, its real constitution or physis originated in opposing principles. 
This “flame” (phlox) and this “night” (nyx) (i.e. some sort of 
privation of Light) are forms in lack of real ontological consistency. 
Whereas “what is” remains in itself and possesses a self-grounded 
identity,  each morphê discriminated by mortals acquires its identity only 31
 It should be noted that when Simplicius thematizes the arkhai, he feels compelled to quote not only B8,53-59 but 30
also the four verses of B9 (In phys., 179.27). This is not the case with other passages where B8,53 ff. are quoted. In 
38,28 he is interested in advocating for the ontological dualism in Parmenides and merely shows that the Eleatic had 
something to say both about the intelligible and about the sensible. In 30,20, a reference to the arkhai is made, and B9 
appears to be substituted for a marginal note found in his manuscript, where the role of opposing principles is 
abstractly explained. Pulpito, 208-210, also distinguishes between morphai and the principles but sees in demas the 
“constitutive aspects” of things, expressed as pairs of opposites. We would rather not insist on such a terminological 
distinction, because then ekrinanto demas (B8,55) would attribute to the mortals themselves the knowledge of the 
structure of oppositions underlying the forms they name. The description of opposite predicates is part of the Goddess 
revelation and mortals are unaware of how important their interconnexion is for the understanding of reality.
 B8,29: ταὐτόν τ᾽ ἐν ταὐτῷ τε µένον καθ᾽ ἑαυτό τε κεῖται.31
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insofar as it depends on its own alterity   – in this sense, none of them is 32
“necessary” (B8,54). Mortals conventionally separate what in nature is a 
dynamics of opposites in the constitution of each thing in the 
universe.   It is the Goddess’ task to reveal the operation accomplished 33
by mortals when they name forms, by making explicit the contrary 
predicates underlying each named thing. In so doing, she also discloses 
the interplay of a “cosmic arrangement” (diakosmos) of forces ultimately 
derived from the primary opposition of Light and Night,  an interplay 34
which exists in everything. 
To learn “that” and “how” mortals err – respectively in the 
Alêtheia and Doxa sections – is not yet, however, to have an explanation 
on “why” this is the case. The purpose of giving such an account is 
announced at B1,31: the disciple shall learn “the manner how (hôs)  35
the things-purported-to-be (dokounta) were to be necessarily accepted, 
through all, as if they were beings .” It is very likely that the 36
cosmological discourse, beginning with a cosmo-theogonical account, 
 B8,57-58: ἑωυτῷ πάντοσε τωὐτόν, τῷ δ᾽ ἑτέρῳ µὴ τωὐτόν. Each form is identical to itself only inasmuch as it is 32
in “in all regards” (pantose) different from another (tôi here has explicative value). The mortal-named morphai can thus 
be characterized as or entailing “enantiomorphic opposites” (cf. Curd 12). But this cannot be applied to the principles 
themselves nor to their dynameis.
 In naming and discriminating mortals somehow acknowledge the presence of opposing principles: episemai in 33
B19,3 should be read in the strong sense of recognizing the signs of those principles in each named thing. Naming, 
however, fixates the appearance of a separated unity (cf. χωρὶς ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων, B8,56) that disguises the reality of the 
mixture.
 Thanassas, 64, also emphasizes the prefix dia- as introductory of the concept of “mixture,” and recognizes the equal 34
standing of the principles in that they “determine and dominate the world order.” He does not allow, though, for a 
distinction between the principles and the morphai, which seems to be crucial for the understanding of the Doxa-
passages.
  Dehon, 282, correctly pointed out that the Goddess here does not invite to know dokounta, but instead emphasizes 35
“the manner how” they were to exist. Mullach was fortunate when he translated the conjunction by quomodo.
 Brague proposed πάντ᾽ἅπερ ὄντα as a correction for the corrupted reading πάντα †περ† ὄντα in the mss., based 36
on Simplicius’ expression δοκοῦν ὄν (In de caelo, 557.20) (Brague 56–57). The first to have noted that the participle 
escapes the regular Platonic phraseology, thus conveying a reproduction of the language of B1.31, appears to be Falus, 
283.
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proceeded with a zoogony followed by an anthropogony.  It is very 37
likely that we find B16 in the context of the anthropogony, where 
Parmenides develops some sort of physiological account of human 
cognition or perception. The Parmenidean thesis of homology of the 
cognitive organs with their objects appears to be significant enough to 
be quoted both by Aristotle and Theophrastus when they discuss their 
predecessors’ theories of perception. The fragment, it seems, may 
describe the conditions for the appearance of intelligence among 
humans (tôs noos anthrôpoisi paristatai)  in terms of a mixture of limbs 38
(krasis meleôn, B16,1-2). Theophrastus explicitly relates the fragment to 
the doctrine of two elements (duouin stoikheion)  which, as our 39
evidence suggests, should be identified with the diakosmos presented in 
the Doxa section (B8,53-59, B9). 
Parmenides seems to be interested in demonstrating the presence 
of the primordial duality not only in the human cognitive apparatus but 
in everything else in the universe. We can detect dualities in the extant 
direct quotations of the cosmogonical part of the poem: female/male 
(B12), Moon/Sun (B14-15), feminine seeds/masculine seeds (B18). The 
sources derived from Aëtius, moreover, inform us about cosmological 
descriptions where we can identify the explanatory role of opposites 
whose relation to primordial principles is attested to in B9 (they are 
their powers or properties, dynameis). Parmenides asserted that the Moon 
 The sequence of explanations on the origins of the universe, on the gods, on animals, on the origins of humans 37
(sometimes including their first political organizations) is archaic, persists in Plato’s Timaeus-Critias and can be found 
as late as Lucrecius’ De rerum natura (see Naddaf). The general picture provided by Simplicius (see the table above), 
and especially his description of Parmenidean cosmogony as γένεσις τῶν γινοµένων καὶ φθειροµένων µέχρι τῶν 
µορίων τῶν ζῴων (In de caelo, 559,20-560,1) provide reasonable grounds to believe that our Eleatic is following the 
traditional scheme.
 Is this “appearance” a bodily state or a particular stage in the cosmic evolution where a certain combination is 38
produced, that of the cognitive capability that characterizes the human form? It is difficult to decide. Although not 
discussing any cosmogonical implications, Hershbell, 12, associates the physis of the limbs of human body with the 
noos, in the sense of their governing “constitution.”
 De sensu, 3.1.39
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and the Sun have their origins in the Milky Way, the Moon deriving 
from dense regions (which accounts for its coldness), the Sun from the 
rare (explaining its hotness) (Dox. 349,10-11); he tried to circumscribe 
the inhabited zones in the Earth, distinguishing its regions (377,18-20), 
and inferring that males originate in the North (associated with 
coldness), females in the South (associated with heat) (419,12-23); he 
also explained ageing as a diminution of heat (443). The positing of 
ultimate principles has etiological purposes: it allows to account for 
phenomena on the basis of oppositions derived from them, revealing the 
presence of Light and Night in the physis of each individual thing. 
The account of the origins of all things in the universe includes 
an account of the constitution of humans and their cognitive 
capabilities, both grounded in the opposition of principles: hot knows 
hot, cold knows cold.   The human perception of reality is explained on 40
the same grounds as those of all other existing things in the universe: 
the cosmogonical narrative unfolds from the primordial past to the 
present state of the universe, where there are human beings and things 
around them offering themselves to their judgment (kata doxan ephy 
tade kai nun easi, B19,1). The demonstrative pronoun (tade) here is in 
parallel to epi toisi te kai tois in B9: Parmenides seems to take great care 
in refusing to attribute the status of eonta to the individual, concrete 
things. They “are” not, strictly speaking, except for the misleading 
judgment of mortals. This would explain the play of words in B1,31, 
when the Goddess describes individual things as “things-purported-to-
be” (dokounta), that is: things as they present themselves to the 
immediate, uncritical human experience. 
The doxai fail to discriminate between Being and Non-Being, 
and the Alêtheia-argument provides the rigorous criteria for thinking to 
 See Laks, 13-14, for the interpretation of symmetria in Theophrastus’ De Sensibus account: in the cognitive act, 40
each of the two elements perceives and cognizes for itself. Thus the term describes the “adaptation” of (each element 
in) the senses to their objects and not the “proportion” in the mixture.
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eon. Once the criticism on opinions is complete with the deduction of 
Being, the Goddess can shift her perspective: it is no longer a matter of 
showing the contradictions of the ordinary human language, but rather 
of providing an explanation for the very erring of mortals. And this 
explanation seems to be in line with the general cosmological accounts, 
insofar as we consider the presence of opposing principles in the 
cognitive framework of mortals as the reason for their judgment being 
twofold: as stated in the Doxa, they name forms according to two 
perspectives (duo gnomais, B8,53), and are misled in taking one aspect of 
reality (one of the two principles and their dynameis) for what they 
predicate “being,” the other for what they call “non-being.” The 
cosmological discourse is then not simply the gathering of a piece of 
encyclopedical knowledge about the universe but is also directed at an 
epistemological goal, indicating the presence of principles through the 
investigation of nature and completing the explanation begun in the 
Doxa that accounts for the naturally “errant” perception of men.  41
Some consequences for Parmenidean “ontology” 
The interpretation sketched here suggests that we follow a 
continuous thread, which runs through the different “sections” of 
Parmenides’ Poem. It also tries to account for Parmenides’ scientific 
interest in speculations about “everything” (panta). This “everything” 
must be considered as the overall subject of the Poem. It is mentioned in 
the very first lines of the proem (kata panta, B1,3), to be then thematised 
by the Goddess in her opening speech (panta puthesthai, B1,28). It also 
appears to be constantly reworked throughout the Poem, as the 
 This, of course, entails a sort of “circular demonstration” of which Parmenides appeared to be very proud in his 41
discourse (cf.  B5 and the εὐκυκλέος-lesson at B1.29). This interpretation thus extends the recognition of that 
methodological preference as not restricted to the demonstration of the sêmata of Being in Alêtheia, but also present in 
the Diakosmêsis, insofar as it begins and probably ends with an account for mortal error. 
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argument progresses.  Most notably, in Alêtheia we find an adverbial use 
of pan connected with einai: what-is needs “to be completely” (pampan 
peleinai, B8,11); it “is wholly” (pan estin, B8,22) homogeneous; it also “is 
in everything” (pan estin, B8,25) continuous. At the same time, 
Parmenides also strongly suggests cosmological implications when 
employing panta as a noun in double constructions: dia pantos panta 
(B1,32), pantêi pantôs kata kosmon (B4,3). It is interesting to find a 
corresponding repetition of the participle form eon, as this usage also 
seems to dilute any insinuation of differentiated multiplicity back into 
continuous unity when the Goddess says that “what-is touches what-is” 
– cf. eon gar eonti pelazei, B8,25. Finally, at B8,38-39 – despite 
difficulties with the establishment of this text and its grammatical 
construction – “everything” (panta) is put in some connection with 
human language (cf. onoma). 
Of course, the argument on Being should introduce some 
nontrivial feature for our understanding of “everything.” The novelty of 
Parmenidean “ontology” vis-à-vis Ionian cosmology, however, does not 
oblige us to forcefully assume a direct polemic against the scientifical 
speculations of the time, quite the contrary. To say the least, the talk 
about “what is” did not prevent Parmenides from elaborating his 
cosmology, as we have seen. However, we could say more: the 
understanding of the universe from the emergent cosmological sciences 
already implied casting doubt over ordinary conceptions on what there 
is. Even before Parmenides, the commonsensical view of human 
opinions is challenged in favour of naming abstract properties (“the hot”, 
“the cold”, “the dense”, “the rare”) as the actual constituents of reality, 
considering their capacities for changing into one another as what 
properly “is.” Anaximander appears to have taught that what underlies 
each thing we perceive and truly determines their nature is a constant 
interplay of elementary opposites, so much so that for him the ultimate 
principle of all things can only be said to be something 
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“unlimited” (apeiron).   When Parmenides introduces the deductive 42
argument in Alêtheia, his polemics appear to aim non-scientific 
“opinions of mortals.” He seems sure to have invented a strong discourse 
to counter widespread beliefs – and this we can understand as a criticism 
of popular conceptions in favour of the new scientific worldview. 
If we accept the preceding argument, we will also have to accept 
two implications: First, that the demonstration of Being in the Poem is 
not an end in itself, but rather a preparation for the cosmological 
presentation coming after Alêtheia (in the Doxa and Diakosmêsis parts). 
Such an interpretation puts into question the degree of prominence of 
ontology in Parmenides. Even more so because of a second implication, 
that an important discontinuity would have to be assumed: the argument 
on Being, intended as polemical against non-scientific views, does not 
by itself provide the theoretical grounds for investigating the physis of 
each thing. Cosmology is not directly deduced from ontology. Instead, 
the argument in Alêtheia, as we read it, allows for a critical perspective 
on mortal doxai (and their language), which seems to be, in the Poem, 
only a step for the further disclosure of the primary ‘forces’ or ‘capacities’ 
(dynameis) relevant for explaining the features of the cosmos. This 
interpretation is not mere speculation, but a hypothesis which puts us in 
a position to better understand some of the best of our ancient 
testimonies, where such discontinuity is never deemed to be anything 
scandalous. Aristotle, in particular, has no problem in acknowledging 
the Parmenidean doctrine of two aitiai for cosmological explanations, 
  Teophrastus (apud Simplicius). Phys. op. 2 = Dox. 476. Ἀναξίµανδρος… ἀρχήν τε καὶ στοιχεῖον εἴρηκε τῶν 42
ὄντων τὸ ἄπειρον, πρῶτος τοῦτο τοὔνοµα κοµίσας τῆς ἀρχῆς· λέγει δὲ αὐτὴν µήτε ὕδωρ µήτε ἄλλο τι τῶν 
καλουµένων εἶναι στοιχείων, ἀλλ’ ἑτέραν τινὰ φύσιν ἄπειρον. I don’t take ta onta here as signifying the elements, 
but individual things in a broader sense. Furthermore, I do not think that the plural participle of being had already 
that terminological sense for Anaximander. Kahn, who has claims for the view I here deny, honestly admits that our 
documentation does not confirm any of the alternatives, and recognizes that the choice remains a matter of historical 
interpretation (Kahn 175). I assume that the concept of ta onta as identification of the fundamental constituents of 
reality belongs to the history of effect of the Parmenidean eon.
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separate from the account of the One-Being (Phys. I 5, 188a19-22; Met. 
I 5, 986b27-987a2; De gen. et corr., I 3, 318b3-7). But Aristotle’s 
polemics with Parmenidean monism is another story for another time: if 
the current hypothesis is correct, it could be described as an original 
attempt to develop natural philosophy in the framework supplied by a 
robust conception of science (epistêmê), devising principles such as form, 
subject and privation. Aristotle then forges the path to provide Physics 
with its proper ontological grounds, and the ability to talk about physêi 
onta (plural) – something completely lacking in Parmenides. 
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